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Abstract 
 
Deterrence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003: A critical appreciation of the effectiveness of its 
innovative criminal policy and the struggle between the outcome of a controversial political decision and 
the principle of proportionality. 
 
 
Summary 
 
1. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 reduces deterrence within the UK criminal justice 
system 
2.  References
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1. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 reduces deterrence within the UK criminal justice 
system 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003 (hereafter “CJA 2003”) received Royal Assent on 20th November 
2003. Its aim was to modernise the criminal justice system from end to end so that it would 
deliver justice more often and more consistently. So, to sum up, we can say that the main aim of 
the Act was to reduce crime and re-offending by updating the criminal justice system. It creates 
for the first time in this country a scheme for comprehensive sentencing guidelines. Now, almost 
three years after his approval, we can appreciate the effectiveness of this innovative criminal 
policy. 
 
In one sense the landscape of sentencing has changed utterly over the 50-year period. The biggest 
single change has been the far greater involvement by Parliament in sentencing, an area of policy 
which 50 years ago was regarded as quintessentially one of judicial discretion. 
 
In July 2002 the Government published a White Paper outlining its plans for the criminal justice 
system, from crime prevention through to the punishment and rehabilitation of offenders. This 
Paper (legally named ‘Justice for All’) focused particularly on reforms to court procedure and 
sentencing, to make trials faster and to deliver clear, consistent and appropriate sentencing. On 
these issues the White Paper built on the proposals in two consultation documents: Review of the 
Criminal Courts of England and Wales by Sir Robin AULD (2001) and Making Punishment Work: report 
of a review of the sentencing framework of England and Wales (2001) by John HALLIDAY. This Act is 
intended to introduce reforms in these two areas. 
 
Some two-thirds of the 339 sections in the CJA 2003 concern sentencing, and the changes are yet 
far-reaching. For the first time the purposes of sentencing have been included in legislation. 
These are: Punishment (the ‘automatic’ life sentence is abolished by the 2003 Act), Reduction of 
crime (including deterrence), Reform and rehabilitation, Protection of the public and Making 
reparation.  
 
The legal system of sentencing must have an effect in the population’s behaviour but, does it 
necessarily mean to support a legal system of retribution? Many authors do not think so. The 
broad purpose of any Criminal Justice Act must be to bring about a form of proportionality in 
sentencing, recognising a hierarchy of penalty levels. A modern system of sentencing should 
always be able to make differences –when sentencing- between offenders who represent, in fact, a 
danger of serious harm, and other offenders who do not represent such danger.  
 
With the new way of sentencing introduced by the CJA 2003, the condition that must be fulfilled 
before a court imposes any hard sentence is a finding that there is a significant risk to members of 
the public of serious harm occasioned by the commission by the offender of further specified 
offences. Serious harm here means death or serious personal injury, whether physical or 
psychological. Thus, one of the problems is that the key term ‘significant risk’ is actually 
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underdefined, and the interpretation of it –be wide or restrict- can be a danger to the proper aim 
of the term itself. 
 
One of the Acts that preceded the CJA 2003, the Criminal Justice Act from 1991 stated, in relation 
to the length of prison sentences, only that sentences should be commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offence. This statement, however, was after redrafted to mean commensurate 
with the punishment and deterrence which the seriousness of the offence requires. The 
Government thought, then, that the proper answer to the offences needed to involve both a 
punishment and deterrence. But let me now come back to the CJA 2003 to underline some of the 
most important sections according to sentencing. Sections 148, 152 and 153, about the seriousness 
of the offence, seem to contradict themselves. Part 142 includes the purposes of sentencing and 
Part 143 gives a definition for persistent offenders –those who, in words of the Act, where 
convicted six or more times in twelve months, after this had come into force. In 2004, the 
Government suggested to change this definition of persistent offenders, as they where mostly 
shoplifters and there was, after all, no way of stopping shoplifters by giving them hard sentences. 
So, it seems that rising the length of sentences does not have any effect in shoplifters, this method 
definitely does not work, as it never deters shoplifters from shoplifting. Prison sentences of less 
than 12 months where imposed frequently on persistent offenders, and it has been known that 
they provided minimal protection to the public and little help –if any- to offenders in breaking 
cycles of re-offending. So, in this point, the CJA 2003 does not seem to give any help to solve the 
matter of deterrence, as this mechanism did not deter offenders from carrying on with their 
crimes. It should also be known that under the CJA 2003, the most significant change of general 
principle concerns the effect of previous convictions. Those must be considered by the judge as 
aggravating circumstances, but cannot be used to determine if the offender is guilty or not guilty. 
The reference to ‘each conviction’ points towards a cumulative approach, whereby courts may 
continually ratchet sentences upwards for persistent offenders. Many authors disagree in this 
point, arguing that the offender should only be judged for his/her present facts. Otherwise, 
sentencing becomes no more than a mere punishment based in retribution and in an inadequate 
system of deterrence, as considering each past sentence as an aggravating circumstance could 
easily be understood and considered as a breach of the principle of proportionality –one of the 
key principles in retribution since the 1970’s. This level of sentencing for the repetition of 
relatively minor offences is unfair and out of all proportion, and could lead to such offenders 
receiving sentences of the length normally reserved for serious offences, such as sexual and 
violent offences.  
 
Provisions for Early Release reveal that there have always been –since the Criminal Justice Act 
1991- purposes and guidelines to reduce the use of imprisonment, but there is little evidence that 
practices ever changed. 
 
The CJA 2003 also restates in new language (Community Orders) the criteria for the imposition of 
Community Sentences –Part 11, Chapter 2. Where under certain provisions there is a minimum 
sentence fixed by law, no Community Sentence must be imposed. In addition to this, the CJA 
2003 introduces the possibility of a Community Sentence where the ‘serious enough’ threshold 
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has not been passed –if the offender has had three convictions for which he has been fined since 
the age of 16. A Community Order can be imposed for up to 3 years and will include one or more 
of 12 requirements, such as ‘supervision’ or ‘unpaid work’, between others. Punishment, 
reparation and rehabilitation are the purposes resting beneath these requirements –remember the 
‘supervision’ and ‘mental health’ combined requirement given to the 10 years old murderers John 
Venables and Robert Thompson in 1994, almost 12 years ago, in a famous murder case that 
shocked and amazed the whole population in England. 
 
The question now is: is the mission of the CJA 2003 accomplished? Has the Government put the 
sense back into sentencing as promised in the White Paper? Nicholas MOSS JP, Chairman, North 
Herts Bench/ Chair, Hertfordshire Probation Board, thinks it is mission partly accomplished. Re-
offending, he says, has been reduced under the CJA 2003. 
 
The role of sentencing, in words of Andrew ASHWORTH, was to ensure the safety of the 
community, help rehabilitate offenders to prevent them re-offending and reserve imprisonment 
for a limited range of serious, dangerous and persistent offenders. But, why should we have a 
system that recognizes prevention and deterrence?  
 
The retribution based on the principle of proportionality must be the departure of a criminal 
system, but it is also crucial to have a system of deterrence. However, yet the CJA 2003 restricts 
the power of the courts to imprison offenders who do not represent a risk of serious harm to the 
public. Anyway, do increasing sentences have any effect in deterrence? In other words, does an 
increase in sentence severity simply reflect an upward shift in the seriousness of offending? 
Evidence for this is difficult to find: research by HOUGH et al. in 2003 examined such claims, but 
concluded that there was no statistical evidence to support them. The purpose of the Act in this 
point is to focus on public protection through increasing levels of sentence severity but, from my 
humble point of view, this is an absolutely inappropriate decision, as it does not give any proper 
solution to the matter of those who need to commit a crime. The absolute maximum for 
dangerous offenders under the CJA 2003 is life sentencing, and it is always difficult for the judge 
to decide the exact length of the sentence, for how long will the defendants be a danger for the 
society, etc. In addition to this, we can also confirm that the CJA 2003 offers a system of appeals 
that deters offenders from appealing, as the system gives The Crown Court the full power of The 
Magistrates when an offender appeals to The Crown Court against a sentence of The Magistrates. 
We can never forget that deterrence is based on people’s knowledge: if we are rising sentences in 
order to deter people from committing crimes, we must be sure that people know it. Otherwise, 
deterrence does not work at all. 
 
According to the Guideline Machinery, the 2003 Act now changes the structure of the last act in 
major ways, and both the ‘Halliday Report’ and ‘Justice for all’ promoted the objective of creating 
comprehensive sentencing guidelines. The advantages of this would lie in the values of 
consistency and coherence: the starting points and key factors would be known and the whole 
system would be more transparent. But let’s now talk about the Community Sentence. Section 
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148 of the CJA 2003 states that a Court must not pass a Community Sentence unless satisfied that 
the seriousness of the offence is sufficient to warrant such a sentence.  
 
At last, we must admit that there is no evidence on the results of this system: we do not know if 
raising sentences helps deterrence, as correlation is not causation –between statistics. 
 
To sum up, I truly believe that I am not far from the truth if I state that, in a wide range of 
matters, such as the ones exposed and argued before, the CJA 2003 is trying to increase sentences 
with the main aim of deterrence. This decision can become a dangerous weapon against the 
principle of proportionality and can also painfully wound the eventual rehabilitation of the 
offender, as he/she will be given a sentence out of proportion that will never offer him/her the 
chance to come back to a normal life in society. In addition to this, we must admit that the CJA 
2003 forgets about those offenders who are not sensitive to the increasing of sentences, as their 
crimes are nothing but an answer to their needs (drug dealers, shoplifters...). So, is it a sensible 
decision to increase the sentences of those who need to commit crimes to live? What kind of 
message are we sending to these people? Are we really deterring them from committing more 
crimes? Honestly, I do not think so. They will just find themselves trapped in the machinery of a 
system of no second chances, and the CJA 2003 will have failed in its purpose of deterring 
criminals from violating the law. It is a fact, Edward LAIJAS says, that if people are thinking of 
committing a crime and are aware that they will be released because of early parole, then it will 
not effectively deter any future crime from happening, but it does not mean that deterrence must 
be reduced to retribution. Otherwise, we should be considering capital punishment as an 
effective and fair retributive justice –nothing farther from our purpose. This is why the principle 
of proportionality raises as one of the key principles that inform the interpretation of the law. 
Deterrence, if I am not wrong, can be defined as the prevention from action by fear of the 
consequences, a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable 
counteraction. So, deterrence is a means of controlling a person’s behaviour through negative 
motivational influences, namely fear of punishment. But fear and punishment out of proportion 
and with no sense does not link to the meaning of a democratic society. Human being, I believe, 
should be conceived as a ‘social animal’, so that any punishment given for his/her eventual 
antisocial behaviours should always suggest his/her rehabilitation, his/her reintegration into 
society. This is -I sincerely believe- what the CJA 2003 rejected among its principles when the 
decision of increasing sentences was made. Perhaps we will have to think over this for the next 
Act.  
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